![[mail.gif]](../Mail.gif) For further questions on this
report, contact Bob Christ: forum@chesco.com
I have no official capacity to investigate this accident since it occurred outside of
the US. Had this occured at my DZ, I would have been charged with assisting in the
investigation as a USPA Instructor/Examiner and FAA licensed parachute rigger. I have
produced this analysis so as to gain some measure of insight into the problems these men
encountered so as to avoid the consequences of this accident in the future. I understand
that the Chileans still have the gear; therefore, no US organization has had a chance to
examine the 3 deceased skydivers rigs (although the evidence thus far indicates there was
no gear malfunctions). Although I am sure more information will come to light as time goes
by, I feel there has been enough information gathered to make a conclusion as to the
cause(s) of this accident with a high-degree of certainty.
Weather: (12/6 at 1200 GMT): 4,000 scattered, visibility unlimited, winds 140
true (from the direction of the 140 East Meridian) at 7 knots, temperature -29.9C,
altimeter setting was 28.76" Hg (about 1.16" below standard sea level pressure
of 29.92 - typical for pressure at the South Pole)
Organization: Adventure Network International provided the logistical support for
this operation. From all indications that I received, I believe Ray Miller and Steve
Mulholland were being compensated by ANI for their efforts in organizing the Expedition.
In other words, ANI was in full operational charge of this operation. I will make
reference to Ray's and Steve's experience levels below. I am not sure whether it was Ray
or Steve who was doing the organizing for the 4-way.
Planned Activity: 4-way freefall formation with the point being pulled from the
aircraft.
Aircraft: Lockheed L-100 (Operated by SAFAir of Johannesburg, SA) from Punta Arenas, Chile
to Patriot Hills, Antarctica (80S, 81W). DeHavilland DHC-6-300 (Operated by Ken Borric Air
of Calgary, Canada) from Patriot Hills to Amundsen-Scott Base at the geographical South
Pole. Only 1 jump was executed during this profile.
Drop Exit Altitude: approximately 8,500 ft. AGL or 17,801 ft. AMSL (DZ at 9,301 ft.
AMSL) Profile: The aircraft landed first at Pole, took off the door then climbed to
altitude. I am not sure at what altitude the aircraft cruised to Pole, but it is normally
at 12,500 ft. AMSL (approximately 3,000 ft. AGL). Their route of flight from Patriot Hills
to Pole was between the Horlick Mountains and the Pensacola Mountains which is a gradual
climbing terrain to 9,301 AMSL. I am not sure how long they would have remained at the
cruise altitude and what effect this had on hypoxia during the jump. The Twin Otter in
wheel/ski configuration cruises at approx. 140 kts. and the distance is 585 nm. Time of
flight is approx. 4.5 hours. The DeHavilland DHC-6-300 Twin Otter has an unpressurized
cabin. I do not believe they would have had enough oxygen aboard for the jumpers to
pre-breath oxygen before landing at Pole and climb to altitude for drop - nor do I believe
they did so.
The jump: From Michael Kearns' statement (as well as sources close to the debrief),
it appears that they did have supplemental oxygen aboard the aircraft and some of the
jumpers did use it during the climb to altitude. None of the deceased were reported to
have AAD's. None had bail out oxygen. From what I can gather, they tried to pull a 4-way
from the aircraft which funneled. Two people were able to put together a 2-way as the
remaining 2 jumpers tried to close for a 4-way. Michael Kearns was on final approach to
dock on the freefall formation with one other behind him when his CYPRES fired at its
preset altitude of 750 ft. AGL. Mike made no report of any signal by the load organizer to
break the freefall formation for separation during opening. Mike had only time enough to
unstow his brakes and turn into the wind before hitting hard on the ice. He went
immediately to the base to get help. The base personnel retraced Mike's steps in the snow
with skidoos and, after a short search, found the 3 bodies. Planned breakoff was at 4,000
ft. AGL with opening at 3,500 ft. AGL minimum. All 3 of the deceased impacted the snow in
close proximity and were partially buried beneath the surface. Steve Mulholland was the
only one of the 3 deceased to have a partial deployment. Since we have not been able to
examine the gear - specifically the closure loop on Steve's main, I am not certain whether
the deployment was caused by impact or by efforts at deployment. From what I knew of
Steve, I assume he made an effort at deployment.
ANALYSIS: I spoke with several sources close to the investigation and have
formed this analysis of the accident based upon my knowledge of the people involved and
the facts surrounding the case. I have been told that there will be an article in
Parachutist on the accident which may give a few more details other than that included in
this report. From what I know about Ray and Steve, Ray was not an active jumper which
would make him non-proficient in Relative Work. Steve's main hobby was BASE jumping which
is not an RW discipline. Steve told me he had approximately 100 skydives (non-BASE jumps)
as well as the first known Antarctic BASE jump while working for Antarctic Support
Associates in support of the USAP. Hans Rezac's main hobby was "extreme sports"
including a nude jump last year in -20C weather. Hans was not a relative worker either. I
have no information about Mike Kearns.
Once the formation funneled off of the aircraft, the remainder of the dive was spent
trying for a 4-way completion. Mike Kearns was closing for a 3 way when his CYPRES fired
and deployed his reserve parachute.
True airspeed increases (i.e. frontal area air resistance used to support a freefalling
body) with an increase in altitude by a margin of 2% per thousand feet above sea level
pressure as a rule of thumb. That means that at 18,000 ft. AMSL, terminal velocity is 36%
faster than the sea level t.v. of 120 mph (or 163 mph). At 12,000 ft. (minimum container
opening altitude) it is approx. 24% faster. The average during the freefall time is
approximately 156 or ~160 mph. The normal freefall time of 41 seconds (from the Skydivers
Information Manual freefall times chart) is now cut down to about 32 seconds (2.67 miles
per minutes over 6,000 ft or ~1.2 miles plus time to accelerate to terminal). Add to that
hypoxia, no Dytter Audible Altitude Warning Device, no AAD's, no practice jumps,
inexperience, the stress of travel to get to the South Pole, cold, nervousness of jumping
a hostile environment, lack of preparation, disorganization and
distraction/temporal distortion from doing a freefall formation without proficiency.
In aviation accidents, normally one problem does not add up to an incident. It normally
takes several problems to lead to a disaster. Any one of these factors would not have lead
up to this accident (reference Trond Jacobsen's successful jump from the same aircraft on
the same flight and same pass at altitude). From my discussions with Trond, he had done
considerable preparatory work before the expedition. Please refer here for Trond's writeup of the
incident. Parroting a saying in too many skydiving accidents across the world, "An
AAD could have prevented these fatalities". Although all persons on a freefall
formation dive are charged with altitude awareness, the load organizer is charged with
assigning breakoff altitude and assuring that those procedures are followed. Also, a basic
concept in skydiving is the manual deployment of a parachute at a safe altitude above the
ground - an operation which was not followed in this instance.
This concludes my efforts at researching this accident. We have made a few minor
changes to our expedition as a result of this accident, but in whole our planning has
addressed the altimetry, training, experience and equipment issues faced in operations in
this hostile environment. I would like to thank Dwight Fisher at the NSF's Office of Polar
Programs for sharing his in-depth knowledge of Antarctic Aviation during our July, 1996
meeting to discuss operational aspects of our expedition |
